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Abstract
We investigate the effects of changes in the quota for skilled im-
migrants on the welfare of native workers, legal immigrants, and illegal
immigrants under different levels of employer sanctions, assuming a
small open economy with dual labor markets and efficiency wages. We
demonstrate that if fines are large（small），increases in the quota are
likely to increase（decrease）the welfare of native workers and legal
immigrants. Our results suggest that the policy authority has to manipu-
late the immigration quota and employer sanctions simultaneously in
order to increase the welfare of native workers and legal immigrants.
Keywords: International Migration; Efficiency wages; Dual labor
markets; Immigration quotas; Employer sanctions
１．Introduction
This paper investigates the effects of the quota for skilled immigrants on
the welfare of native workers, legal, and illegal immigrants under the differ-
ent levels of employer sanctions, i.e., fines imposed by the authorities on the
firms that employ illegal immigrants, assuming a small open economy with
dual labor markets and efficiency wages.
Today, many countries are faced with a large inflow of foreign workers.1
１ See Agiomirgianakis（2006）for recent developments of migration in Europe and relat-
ed theories.
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Foreign workers have various impacts on the host countries. It is often ar-
gued that the inflow of legal skilled immigrants should be encouraged be-
cause their inflow seems to have positive impacts on the host countries. On
the other hand, we tend to argue that the acceptance of illegal and/or un-
skilled immigrants should be prohibited since they are likely to have nega-
tive impacts on the host country. Moreover, there are strong arguments to
support the implementation of concrete measures to control the inflow of
such foreign workers, and many countries are, in fact, attempting to moder-
ate this inflow by utilizing a variety of control methods.
In response to these developments and on the basis of studies on the ef-
fects of immigration on the receiving countries, there has been a rapid
proliferation of literatures suggesting effective methods to control foreign
worker inflow.2 Ethier（1986）provided the first formal analysis on the im-
pact of illegal immigration by examining the effects of border and domestic
２ The effects of immigration have been analyzed by many authors by utilizing open eco-
nomic models with dual labor markets; this paper implements a similar approach. These
analyses can be divided into two groups. One group of analyses that include Agiomir-
gianakis and Zervoyianni（2001），Kemnitz（2003），and Shimada（2005）is based on
the labor union models that were developed by Dunlop（1944），Oswald（1985），and
McDonald and Solow（1981）．Another group assumes the efficiency wage hypothesis in
the tradition of Shapiro and Stiglitz（1984）and Bulow and Summers（1986）．This
group comprises researchers such as Carter（1998，1999）and M ller（1999，2003a，
2003b）．Results regarding the effect of immigration on the receiving countries are not
uniform because these effects differ depending on the manner in which the model of the
receiving countries is formulated. For example, Agiomirgianakis and Zervoyianni（2001）
focused on the problem arising from illegal unskilled foreign worker inflow and demon-
strated that its effects depend on the receiving country's regime. In particular, when
skilled native workers and policymakers do not cooperate, illegal immigration is likely to
have positive impacts on the entire native labor force. However, when they do cooperate,
illegal immigration may have negative impacts on native workers.
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enforcement policies. Bond and Chen（1987）extended the analysis of Ethi-
er（1986）by deriving a formula for the optimal level of enforcement that
can be implemented against firms that employ illegal workers. Carter（2005）
explored the effects of deportations, employer sanctions, and amnesties by
assuming an economy wherein undocumented workers are endogenously
sorted into the secondary labor market. Canto and Udwadia（1986）exa-
mined the effects of the immigration quota on the average quality of migrat-
ing labor and income distribution. Myers and Papageorgiou（2002）made a
comparison between the effectiveness of the immigration quota and the
proposed system of immigration tolls and emigration subsidies. Lundborg
and Segerstrom（2002）analyzed the effects of the immigration quota on
growth and welfare in a North-South version of the quality ladder growth
model.
In actual economies, many governments usually manipulate multiple con-
trol methods at once to control migration flow. However, most of the previ-
ous analyses on immigration controls did not adequately address the issues
pertaining to the manipulation of the multiple control methods.3 In particu-
lar, they did not pay sufficient attention to the probable relationship between
control methods. Accordingly, these analyses on immigration control are not
necessarily fully satisfactory.
The immigration quota and employer sanctions are the most frequently
combined control methods in many countries.4 Both of these influence the
３ Ethier（1986）is one of a few exceptions. He examined the effects of combining border
enforcement policies and domestic enforcement policies.
４ See Robin and Barros（2000）for the actual measures that were implemented by
OECD member countries in order to prevent and combat the illegal employment of for-
eigners. Certainly, there are doubts regarding the effectiveness of employer sanctions.
See Chiswick（1988）and Boswell and Straubhaar（2004）for the problems pertaining to
employer sanctions.
 KEIEI TO KEIZAI
decisions taken by the firms regarding labor demand and wages. Moreover,
the manipulations of these methods seem to be closely related through the
labor market. This suggests that we cannot independently determine the
amount of the immigration quota from the levels of employer sanctions.
However, many governments fail to take the probable relationship between
them into account and they are often manipulated independently.5
Therefore, this paper introduces these most frequently combined control
methods and aims to demonstrate that the immigration quota and employer
sanctions are not independent for the improvement of native worker and
legal immigrant welfare by showing the effects of the changes in the im-
migration quota for skilled immigrants on the welfare of legal and illegal
workers at different levels of employer sanctions.
For this purpose, we assume a small open economy wherein the labor mar-
ket possesses a dual structure and the wages in the primary and secondary
labor markets are determined according to the non-shirk model. A large
number of skilled and unskilled immigrants are flowing into the small open
economy due to the higher wages in the primary and secondary labor mar-
kets than those in the rest of the world; however, this economy wants to ac-
cept only a limited number of skilled immigrants. For this purpose, it sets up
a quota for skilled immigrants and imposes fines on firms that employ illegal
immigrants. Skilled immigrants who meet the immigration quota and there-
by acquire legal status and all native workers can enter the primary labor
market, whereas the skilled immigrants who do not meet the immigration
quota and all the unskilled immigrants cannot acquire legal status and enter
５ The analysis by Gonzalez（1994）is also in accordance with actual policy-making. He
introduced the border enforcement and employer sanctions into the same model;
however, he manipulated these control methods independently.
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the secondary labor market as illegal immigrants. The primary and second-
ary labor markets are distinct in the sense that jobs in the former are charac-
terized by imperfect observations, whereas jobs in the latter have perfect ob-
servations. They also differ in the sense that the firms run the risk of being
detected and punished by the authorities if they employ workers in the
secondary labor market, whereas they have no risk in employing workers in
the primary labor market.
We demonstrate that if the authorities impose large fines on the firms that
employ illegal immigrants, increases in the quota for skilled immigrants are
likely to benefit the legal workers, i.e., wages and the expected lifetime utili-
ties of native workers and legal immigrants will be greater. This can be ex-
plained as follows: An increase in the immigration quota raises the legal
worker accession rate. Since wages and the expected lifetime utilities of
legal workers are increasing with respect to the legal worker accession rate,
the larger quota implies higher wages and higher expected lifetime utilities.
On the other hand, if the fines are small, increases in the quota for skilled
immigrants are likely to decrease wages and the expected lifetime utilities of
legal workers. In other words, they might worsen the legal worker welfare.
This is because increases in the immigration quota lower the legal worker
accession rate, leading to lower wages and lower expected lifetime utilities
of legal workers.
We also demonstrate that wages and the expected lifetime utilities of
illegal workers are independent of the immigration quota and fines. This can
be explained as follows: As with the legal worker accession rate, the illegal
worker accession rate also depends on migration flow and the immigration
quota. However, wages and the expected lifetime utilities of illegal workers
remain constant because the jobs in the secondary labor market－all of
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which are performed by illegal workers－are perfectly observable; this ren-
ders illegal worker wages and expected lifetime utilities independent of the
migration flow.
These results have the following implications: Increasing the immigration
quota in order to accept a larger number of skilled immigrants does not al-
ways impact native workers positively. Accordingly, it is necessary for the
government to manipulate the immigration quota taking into account the
magnitude of the fine that will be imposed on the firms that employ illegal
workers. In particular, if a country wants to accept a large number of skilled
immigrants by expanding the quota for them, the government will have to
impose larger fines accordingly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
small open economic model with dual labor markets and the efficiency
wages. In this section, we assume the manner in which the foreign workers
flow into the small open economy and how the authorities penalize firms that
employ illegal immigrants. Section 3 examines the effects of the immigration
quota on the welfare of legal and illegal workers, and tries to show that the
immigration quota and fines are not independent. The concluding remarks
are presented in section 4.
２．The Model
We consider a small open economy with dual labor markets consisting of
the primary and secondary labor markets.6 Jobs in the primary labor mar-
６ Other studies exist that have the similar structure to us. Carter（1999）assumed ef-
ficiency wages both in the primary and secondary labor markets for their analyses on the
effects of immigration. On the other hand, M ller（1999）considered efficiency wages
only in the primary labor market, and the wages and employment in the secondary labor
market were determined competitively.
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ket are attractive and require skill; therefore, the marginal product of labor
is high. In such a market, workers are required to be skilled and legal. In
contrast, jobs in the secondary labor market are unattractive and do not re-
quire skill; therefore, the marginal product of labor is low. Workers are re-
quired to be neither skilled nor legal in order to enter this market.
A small open economy is connected to the rest of the world through im-
migration. For economic and non-economic reasons, the small open economy
is making an attempt to accept only a limited number of skilled immigrants
by setting up an immigration quota M―.
The number of native workers is denoted by N―, which is assumed to be a
constant. All these workers are both skilled and legal by definition, and
thereby, they participate only in the primary labor market.7 In the second-
ary labor market, jobs are unattractive to the extent that the native workers
do not want to be employed there. Accordingly, even if they are not em-
ployed in the primary labor market, they do not enter the secondary market.
All immigrants can acquire legal status provided that they are skilled and
their numbers do not exceed the immigration quota. However, if the number
of skilled immigrants exceeds the quota, only those skilled immigrants who
meet the quota can acquire legal status. The remainder of the skilled im-
migrants is unable to acquire this status; therefore, they become illegal im-
migrants.8
７ According to Massey and Taylor（2004），labor markets in developed nations become
increasingly segmented into a primary sector containing the“good”jobs that are attrac-
tive to the native workers and a secondary sector of poorly paid，“bad”jobs that are
shunned by native workers. This explains why firms turn to legal and illegal unskilled im-
migrants. Even if unskilled native workers existed, their number would be small, and
their effects on the economy would not be significant. Accordingly, we assume that un-
skilled native workers do not exist in the secondary labor market.
８ In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that legal and illegal immigrants do not
to voluntarily return to their home countries.
 KEIEI TO KEIZAI
Due to wage differentials, skilled and unskilled workers migrate between
a small open economy and the rest of the world. In general, if the wages of
skilled and unskilled workers are higher（lower）in the small open economy
than in the rest of the world, skilled and unskilled workers will migrate from
the rest of the world（the small open economy）to the small open economy
（the rest of the world）．9 Two ways of migration are possible. In this paper,
however, we assume that the wages in the rest of the world, i.e., the wages
of skilled and unskilled foreign workers in their home countries－these are
given to the small open economy and remain constant throughout the analy-
sis－are sufficiently lower than those in the small open economy. As a result,
the small open economy will be confronted by an inflow of skilled foreign
workers that exceeds the immigration quota as well as by a significant inflow
of unskilled foreign workers.
Accordingly, the actual number of the skilled and unskilled foreign work-
ersδ(w2－w*) is always sufficiently larger than the immigration quota M
―
and only M― of the skilled immigrants can acquire legal status, where w2
denotes the secondary labor market wages in the small open economy, w*
denotes higher wages among those of skilled and unskilled foreign workers
in their home countries, andδwhich is a positive constant, measures the sen-
sitivity of migration flow to the changes in the differentials between w2 and
w*.10 The remainder of the immigrants, i.e., the skilled immigrants who
９ In this paper, the product price does not change and is assumed to be one; therefore,
we have no need to make distinctions between the real and nominal wages.
10 Workers from the rest of the world are aware of the fact that, even though they are
skilled, all of them cannot acquire legal status after migration; hence, some of them are
left with no option than to enter the secondary labor market. In other words, no skilled
foreign worker is certain of acquiring legal status before migration. Rather, since the quo-
ta for the skilled immigrants is very small, the probability that they participate in the pri-
mary labor market is low. Accordingly, skilled immigrants approximate their expected
Illegal Immigration, Immigration Quotas, and Employer Sanctions 
cannot acquire legal status and all unskilled immigrants δ(w2－w*)－M
―
are left with no other option than to become illegal immigrants.
Therefore, there are N― native workers and M― legal skilled immigrants in
the primary labor market of a small open economy.11 In the secondary labor
market, δ(w2－w*)－M
― illegal skilled or unskilled immigrants exist.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production technology and considering capital
to be fixed, the output in a small open economy Y increases with an increase
in employment in the primary labor market, i.e., legal worker employment





Firms are perfectly competitive and they demand labor in the primary and
secondary labor markets in such a way as to maximize profits. The native
workers and legal skilled immigrants, who are regarded as perfect sub-
stitutes by firms, are employed in the primary labor market to an extent
wherein their marginal product is equal to the primary labor market wages
w1．In the secondary labor market, similar to Agiomirgianakis and Zer-
voyianni（2001），firms are aware of the fact that by employing illegal
wages in the small open economy by the secondary labor market wages. Moreover, un-
doubtedly, the difference between w2 and home country's wages is larger for immigrants
with lower wages than for those with higher wages. However, we consider that im-
migrants with lower wages have to pay the costs for migration since they are likely to be
inefficient in migration as well as in production. Accordingly, we approximate the wage
difference that motives migration for both types of workers by w2－w*.
11 We assume that all workers in the primary labor market have an identical employment
probability. As with native workers, legal immigrants too do not enter the secondary
labor market even if they are not employed in the primary labor market once they entered
the primary market.
12 The relation a1＞a2 reflects the assumptions that the marginal product of labor is high
in the primary labor market and low in the secondary labor market.
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skilled or unskilled immigrants, they run the risk of being detected by the
authorities, in which case they will be forced to pay a fixed fine f, f＞0，for
each illegal immigrant employed by them; f is a constant and does not
change throughout the analysis.13 We assume that as the number of illegal
immigrants increases, firms will be faced with a higher probability of being
detected. This assumption reflects the following facts: In actual economies,
we cannot perfectly control all the resources that contribute to tracing the
firms that employ illegal immigrants.14 However, as the number of illegal
immigrants increases, the government tends to invest more resources into
locating such firms; consequently, the authorities are likely to detect them
with more efficiency. We represent the probability that the authorities will
discover firms employing illegal immigrants by p, 0＜p＜1，that is assumed
to be an increasing function of δ(w2－w*)－M
―. Accordingly, illegal im-
migrants are employed to the extent wherein their marginal product is equal
to the sum of w2 and the expectation of a fine for employing an illegal im-
migrant p(δ(w2－w*)－M
―)f. The demand functions for legal and illegal work-










13 The authorities are fully aware that all the immigrants in the secondary labor market
are illegal. However, in order to penalize firms for employing illegal immigrants, the
authorities are required to prove that the firms are actually employing those immigrants
in the secondary labor market. Since many firms may circumvent rules by adopting
strategies such as sub-contracting（Boswell and Straubhaar 2004），it is not possible for
the authorities to detect all the firms that employ illegal immigrants.
14 For example, even if the government does not increase the direct expenditure on trac-
ing them, we will have a larger resource allocation and thereby a higher detection proba-
bility if the government spends more on employing police officers. Therefore, this paper
does not solve the maximization problem in order to determine the optimal level of the
resource devoted to tracing firms that employ illegal immigrants.










Equations (1) and (2) indicate that legal and illegal workers are gross com-
plements.
Since firms are unable to completely detect shirking by employed work-
ers, they set wages in a manner that prevents shirking by assuming work-
ers' effort as given（Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984）．As in Bulow and Sum-
mers（1984）and Carter（1999），this paper assumes that a shirker will be
detected and fired at different probabilities in the primary and secondary
labor markets. This is because, as mentioned already, jobs in the two labor
markets are of different types.
The wages and expected lifetime utilities in the primary and secondary
labor markets are derived similarly. If a representative employed worker in
the primary labor market does not shirk, his instantaneous utility is meas-
ured by primary labor market wages minus effort. On the other hand, if he
shirks, his instantaneous utility is measured by primary labor market wages.
However, in such a case, a representative employed worker in the primary
labor market will be detected and fired by firms at the probability ρ1．
Moreover, some of the employed workers in the primary labor market
separate from their jobs, even though they are not fired on the grounds of
shirking. The separation rate in the primary labor market, which is defined
as the ratio of separations due to reasons other than shirking to the number
of employed workers in the primary labor market, is given byβ．The sepa-
ration rate is assumed to be identical in the primary and secondary labor
markets.15
15 The results of this paper remain unchanged even if the separation rates differ in the pri-
mary and secondary labor markets.
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The expected lifetime utility of a representative employed shirker in the




where r is the discount rate and VU1 is the expected lifetime utility of a
representative unemployed worker in the primary labor market. Equation





On the other hand, the expected lifetime utility of a representative em-




where e is effort exerted by a representative employed non-shirker in the pri-
mary labor market. We assume that workers in the primary and secondary
labor markets exert the same level of effort.16 The level of effort is ex-





The employed workers in the primary labor market may or may not shirk
based on a comparison of V NE1 and V
S
E1. In order to prevent the workers from
16 Even if the workers in the primary and secondary markets exert different levels of ef-
fort, the paper's main results remain unchanged as long as effort is exogenous.
17 The analysis will be more general if the employed workers determine the optimal level
of effort in a manner that will maximize their expected lifetime utility given that the
wages are set by firms. See Shimada (2007) for the determination of the optimal level of
effort.
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shirking, firms have to set primary labor market wages to ensure that V NE1
V SE1. However, since there is no reason for firms to pay more than what is es-
sential to eliminate shirking by employed workers in the primary labor mar-
ket, they will set primary labor market wages such that V NE1＝V
S
E1(≡VE1)．






Moreover, VU1 is given by,
rVU1＝w―＋α1(VE1－VU1)， (6)
where w― is the unemployment benefit, which is a constant, andα1 is the ac-
cession rate in the primary labor market, which is defined as the ratio of new
hires in the primary labor market to the number of unemployed workers in
the primary labor market. We assume that the unemployment benefits are
zero in both primary and secondary labor markets. In steady state,α1 must
be such that the flow out of unemployment in the primary labor market is e-
qual to the flow into unemployment in the primary labor market, i.e.,α1(N
―＋
M―－L1)＝βL1．
Utilizing Equations (3')，(4')，(5)，and (6)，the primary labor market





Equation (7.1) suggests that the primary labor market wages increase with
an increase in the accession rate in that market.
The expected lifetime utility of a representative employed worker in the
primary labor market under the non-shirk condition takes the form of,






According to Equation (8.1)，the legal worker expected lifetime utility is
also increasing with respect to their accession rate.
Based on a similar argument, the wages and the expected lifetime utility
of a representative employed worker in the secondary labor market under










whereα2 is the accession rate in the secondary labor market－which is de-
fined as the ratio of new hires in the secondary labor market to the number
of workers unemployed in the secondary labor market.18 In steady state,α2
must be such that the flow out of unemployment in the secondary labor mar-
ket is equal to the flow into unemployment in the secondary labor market,
i.e.,α2{δ(w2－w*)－M
―－L2}＝βL2．
As assumed earlier,ρ1 andρ2 are different. In general, firms cannot easily
monitor effort that is exerted by the workers on skilled jobs, whereas they
can easily monitor effort exerted by the workers on unskilled jobs. This is
because jobs in the primary labor market tend to be complicated, and there-
by it is difficult for the firms to confirm that the workers actually exerted ef-
fort. On the other hand, since jobs in the secondary labor market are likely to
18 Illegal immigrants in actual economies might be deported to their home countries if the
authorities are able to locate the firms employing them. However, as long as the deporta-
tion probability is a constant, the main results of this paper remain unchanged even if
illegal immigrants might be deported to their home countries.
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be not so complicated as those in the primary labor market, the firms can eas-
ily confirm their effort. Accordingly, following Carter (1999)，we assume
that jobs in the primary labor markets have imperfect observations, i.e.,ρ1 is
finite, whereas jobs in the secondary labor markets have perfect observa-
tions, i.e.,ρ2 is infinite.19
Taking the limit of Equations (7.2) and (8.2) asρ2 becomes arbitrarily
large, the secondary labor market wages and the expected lifetime utility of




Equations (7.2') and (8.2') suggest that even in steady state, the wages
and the expected lifetime utility of a representative employed worker in the
secondary labor market are independent of the migratory flow. This can be
explained as follows: In steady state, migration affects the accession rate in
the secondary labor market since α2＝βL2/{δ(w2－w*)－M
―－L2}．
However, the accession rate has no effect on the wages and the expected
lifetime utility of a representative employed worker in such a market since
ρ2 is infinite.
In contrast, wages and the expected lifetime utility of a representative em-
ployed worker in the primary labor market in steady state are affected by
19 As formulated by Carter (1999)，we defineρ1，ρ2 as the probabilities per unit time
that a shirker in the primary and secondary labor markets will be detected and fired.
Therefore,ρi t, i＝1,2, is the probability that a shirker will be detected and fired during a
short interval, [T0, T0＋t]．With perfect observation,ρi t is equal to 1－even with a very
small t－i.e.,ρi is infinite.
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migration. On substitutingα1 that holds in steady state into Equations (7.1)


















Equations (7.1') and (8.1') suggest that, in steady state, the wages and the
expected lifetime utility of a representative employed worker in the primary
labor market are dependent on the migratory flow. This can be explained as
follows: As in Equation (1)，the demand for skilled workers changes with
the number of immigrants. This suggests that the accession rate in the pri-
mary labor market depends on migration indirectly as well as directly.
Moreover, this rate affects wages and the expected lifetime utility in such a
market sinceρ1 is finite.
3．Effects of the Immigration Quota on Legal and
Illegal Workers under the Different Levels of Em-
ployer Sanctions
In this section, we examine how changes in the immigration quota affect
the welfare of the workers in the primary and secondary labor markets when
the levels of employer sanctions are different.
For this purpose, we substitute Equation (7.2') into Equation (1) and
totally differentiate the resulting equation and Equation (7.1')．Eliminating
dw1 from these equations, the effects of the immigration quota on legal work-
er employment are derived as follows:






































Since both the terms on the right-hand side in Equation (9.1) are positive,
increases in the immigration quota will increase legal worker employment,
which is the sum of native worker employment and legal immigrant employ-
ment, i.e., dL1/dM
―＞0．This result stems from the two effects; the effects
on the legal workers' wages in steady state that satisfy their non-shirk condi-
tion (Equation 7.1')－these effects are expressed by the first term on the
right-hand side in Equation (9.1)－and the effects on the demand for legal
workers (Equation 1)，which are expressed by the second term on the
right-hand side in Equation (9.1).
The effects of the former are explained as follows: For any demand for
legal workers L1，increases in the immigration quota exacerbates legal work-
er unemployment N―＋M―－L1，whereas legal worker separation due to rea-
sons other than shirkingβL1 remains constant. Accordingly, for any demand
for legal workers, the accession rate in the primary labor market α1
decreases with increases in the immigration quota. This causes the expected
duration of being unemployed in the primary labor market 1/α1 to be longer,
suggesting that legal workers are more severely punished for being unem-
ployed. Therefore, for any demand for legal workers, the legal worker
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wages that will prevent shirking by them will decrease with increases in the
immigration quota. If w1 is measured on the vertical axis and L1 is measured
on the horizontal axis, the curve that describes Equation (7.1') is upward-
sloping and shifts downwards to the right with increases in the immigration
quota.
The effects of the latter are explained as follows: Since the illegal worker
wages in steady state satisfy their non-shirk condition (Equation 7.2')，and
thereby, the number of immigrantsδ(e－w*) do not depend on the immigra-
tion quota, the number of illegal immigrants decreases with increases in the
immigration quota. This decreases the expected fine and thereby the expect-
ed cost that firms have to pay for employing an illegal immigrant e＋p(δ(e
－w*)－M―)f. Since legal and illegal workers are gross complements as in E-
quations (1) and (2)，the demand for legal workers increases with
decreases in the expected cost for employing an illegal immigrant.
Moreover, as suggested in Equation (1)，the demand curve for legal work-
ers is downward-sloping. Accordingly, it shifts upward to the right with in-
creases in the immigration quota.
These two effects always increase the legal worker employment when the
immigration quota increases.
However, the effects on native worker employment and legal immigrant
employment are not always the same. For larger values of f, by increasing
the immigration quota, the demand curve for legal workers that describes E-
quation (1) shifts upward to the right to a larger extent.20 On the other
hand, the curve that describes Equation (7.1') shifts downward to the right





―)/∂f＝0, where L1 and M





―)/∂f＝0, where L1 and M
―satisfy Equation (7.1').
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and dL1/dM
― becomes larger than the employment probability for legal work
ers L1/(N
―＋M―).22 In such a case, increases in the immigration quota in-
crease the employment probability, i.e., d{L1/(N
―＋M―)}/dM―＞0.23 There-
fore, if f is sufficiently large, both native worker employment and legal im-
migrant employment increase corresponding to an increase in the immigra-
tion quota.
If f is small, a given increase in the immigration quota shifts the demand
curve for legal workers that describes Equation (1) upward to the right to a
smaller extent, whereas a given increase in the immigration quota shifts the
curve that describes Equation (7.1') downward to the right to a larger ex-
tent. If f is sufficiently small, the former effects dominate and dL1/dM
― is
smaller than L1/(N
―＋M―); hence, the employment probability for legal work-
ers decreases as the immigration quota increases.24 Therefore, for
sufficiently small values of f the native worker employment decreases;
however, legal immigrant employment increases with increases in the im-
22 The first term on the right-hand side in Equation (9.1) is smaller than 1 for any values
of f. On the other hand, the partial derivative of the second term on the right-hand side in

















This becomes positive if the marginal product of labor in the secondary labor market is
low and a2 is sufficiently small. Accordingly, in such a case, dL1/dM
― becomes larger for




24 If f＝0，the second term on the right-hand side in Equation (9.1) is equal to 0 and the
first term is smaller than L1/(N
―＋M―).
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migration quota.25























These results have the following interpretations: As shown by Equation (9.
1)，increases in the immigration quota increase the legal worker employ-
ment. Moreover, as legal worker employment increases, legal worker sepa-
ration due to reasons other than shirking increases and legal worker unem-
ployment decreases. These indirect effects lead to a larger accession rate.
However, for any demand for legal workers L1 increases in the immigration
quota directly increase legal worker unemployment. This direct effect leads
to a smaller accession rate. If f is sufficiently large and∂L1/∂M
― is larger
than L1/(N
―＋M―)，then the former indirect effects dominate, and thereby,
∂α1/∂M
―＞0．On the other hand, if f is sufficiently small and∂L1/∂M
― is
smaller than L1/(N
―＋M―)，then the latter direct effect dominates, and there-
by,∂α1/∂M
―＜0．
These results suggest that in a scenario in which the authorities impose
large fines, an increase in the immigration quota results in a higher likeli-
hood for the unemployed legal workers to be reemployed. However, in a
scenario in which the authorities impose small fines, a decrease in the im-
migration quota results in a higher likelihood for the unemployed legal work-
ers to be reemployed.
25 Since the number of native workers does not change, decreases in the employment
probability reduce their employment. However, even if f is small, the sum of native work-
er employment and legal immigrant employment increases with increases in the im-
migration quota as shown in Equation (9.1)．Therefore, it is necessary for legal im-
migrant employment to increase.
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According to Equations (7.1) and (8.1)，wages and the expected lifetime
utility of a representative employed worker in the primary labor market are
increasing with respect to the legal worker accession rate. Therefore, the ef-
fects of changes in the immigration quota on the legal worker wages and ex-





















































We see from Equations (10.1) and (11.1) that increases in the immigration
quota are likely to increase legal worker wages and expected lifetime utility
if fines are large, whereas increases in the immigration quota are likely to
decrease these two if fines are small.26
Therefore, the changes in the immigration quota have different effects on
legal worker wages and expected lifetime utilities depending on the values of
fines, and the expansion of the immigration quota does not necessarily lead
to the improvement of the legal worker welfare. This confirms our inference
that the immigration quota and employer sanctions are related for the im-
provement of the legal worker welfare.
Our results have the following policy implications: The immigration quota
26 If fines are large, legal worker employment increases with the immigration quota. Ac-
cordingly, the legal worker welfare in terms of their employment as well as their wages
and expected lifetime utilities increases with the immigration quota. Moreover, it is likely
that if fines are small, the legal worker welfare in terms of their employment as well as
their wages and expected lifetime utilities decreases with the immigration quota. This is
because, even if legal immigrant employment increases with their quota, the ratio of na-
tive workers among legal workers is large and native worker employment decreases with
the immigration quota.
 KEIEI TO KEIZAI
and fines cannot be manipulated independently. If large fines are imposed,
the government can increase the native worker welfare by increasing the im-
migration quota. On the other hand, if the government can only impose small
fines, it will have to decrease the immigration quota in order to increase the
native worker welfare.
As shown in Equations (7.2') and (8.2')，the immigration quota has no
effects on the wages and the expected lifetime utility of a representative em-







Equations (10.2) and (11.2) suggest that as long as immigrants are illegal
and their jobs are perfectly monitored by firms, their wages and expected
lifetime utilities remain unchanged even if the government manipulates the
immigration quota.
To summarize the results derived in this section, the effects of changes in
the immigration quota on the welfare of the native workers and the legal im-
migrants differ according to the values of the fine. However, the immigra-
tion quota and fines have no effects on the illegal immigrant welfare if firms
can monitor their effort perfectly.
４．Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated how changes in the quota for skilled immigrants
affect the welfare of legal and illegal workers under the different levels of
employer sanctions by utilizing a small open economic model with dual labor
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markets and the efficiency wages hypothesis.
We demonstrated that the immigration quota cannot be manipulated in-
dependently of the levels of employer sanctions if we try to improve the na-
tive worker welfare. Whether the immigration quota should be increased or
decreased depends on the levels of fines. We also showed that the welfare of
illegal workers is independent of the immigration quota and fines.
Our results suggest that expanding the immigration quota in order to ac-
cept a larger number of skilled immigrants does not always improve the na-
tive worker welfare and that if an attempt is made to increase the number of
skilled immigrants by raising the immigration quota, it is necessary for the
government to impose larger fines.
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